I. INTRODUCTION
T he history of the First Amendment is the history of its boundaries.
Though the strength of American free speech doctrine is located chiefly in the formidable barriers that countervailing interests must overcome in order to prevail against free speech values, these barriers have emerged within the boundaries of a largely accepted understand-ing of the scope of the First Amendment itself. There have been many important disagreements about what rules should apply when a law or practice infringes upon the First Amendment, but far fewer disagreements about whether, as a threshold matter, the First Amendment is even implicated at all. We may not always have known how to resolve First Amendment cases, but at least we knew them when we saw them.
As contemporary debates about the threshold applicability of the First Amendment to topics such as copyright,' securities regulation 2 panhandling, 3 telemarketing, 4 antitrust, 5 and hostile-environment sex-ual harassment 6 demonstrate, however, questions about the involvement of the First Amendment in the first instance are often far more consequential than are the issues surrounding the strength of protection that the First Amendment affords the speech to which it applies. 7 Once the First Amendment shows up, much of the game is over. But the question whether the First Amendment shows up at all is rarely addressed, and the answer is too often simply assumed. This inattention to the boundaries of the First Amendment does not make the question any less important, however, and a comprehensive examination of this long-neglected 8 dimension of the First Amendment is well overdue. Such an examination would help us not only to understand 8 The noteworthy exceptions are KENT GREENAVALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE (1989); and Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645, both of which I discuss in Part VII below and both of which focus on that vast quantity of crime-assisting speech that had not (and still has not) generated First Amendment attention. See infra pp. 18oi-03. Like my inquiry here, Greenawalt's is devoted not to expressing shock at a blatant neglect of the First Amendment, but to explaining the obvious though usually unspoken limitations on its scope.
the First Amendment and the forces that shape its development, but also, perhaps more importantly although here more preliminarily, to understand the determinants of constitutional salience -the often mysterious political, social, cultural, historical, psychological, rhetorical, and economic forces that influence which policy questions surface as constitutional issues and which do not. At times the First Amendment's boundaries have figured in the case law and academic commentary, as with the familiar debates about whether obscenity, libel, fighting words, and commercial advertising are inside or outside the coverage of the First Amendment. But more often, the boundary disputes have been invisible. Little case law and not much more commentary explain why the content-based restrictions of speech in the Securities Act of 1933, the Sherman Antitrust Act, the National Labor Relations Act, the Uniform Commercial Code, the law of fraud, conspiracy law, the law of evidence, and countless other areas of statutory and common law do not, at the least, present serious First Amendment issues. Indeed, although warnings of the dangers of socalled "exceptions" to the First Amendment are a staple of civillibertarian rhetoric, 9 even the briefest glimpse at the vast universe of widely accepted content-based restrictions on communication reveals that the speech with which the First Amendment deals is the exception and the speech that may routinely be regulated is the rule.
If we examine the speech that the First Amendment ignores, we can begin to perceive the boundaries of the First Amendment. But recognizing where those boundaries lie gives us less assistance than we might suppose in understanding and applying them as a matter of legal doctrine. Rather, the boundaries of the First Amendment, far more than the doctrine lying within those boundaries, turn out to be a function of a complex and seemingly serendipitous array of factors that cannot be (or at least have not been) reduced to or explained by legal doctrine or by the background philosophical ideas and ideals of the First Amendment. If it is true that more of the First Amendment is explained by its boundaries than we have previously thought, it may also be the case that less of the First Amendment can be explained by the tools of legal and constitutional analysis than we have formerly recognized.
II. THE COVERAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
To set the stage, it will be useful to explain the distinction between the coverage and the protection of the First Amendment. 10 All ruleslegal or otherwise -apply only to some facts and only under some circumstances. 1 Even before we see what a rule does, we must make the initial determination of whether it applies at all -whether we are within its scope of operation. So too with the First Amendment, which of course is not infinitely applicable. Though many cases involve the First Amendment, many more do not. The acts, behaviors, and restrictions not encompassed by the First Amendment at all -the events that remain wholly untouched by the First Amendment -are the ones that are simply not covered by the First Amendment. It is not that the speech is not protected. Rather, the entire event -an event that often involves "speech" in the ordinary language sense of the word -does not present a First Amendment issue at all, and the government's action is consequently measured against no First Amendment standard whatsoever. The First Amendment just does not show up.
When the First Amendment does show up, the full arsenal of First Amendment rules, principles, standards, distinctions, presumptions, tools, factors, and three-part tests becomes available to determine whether the particular speech will actually wind up being protected. Perhaps the speech is an intentional and explicit incitement to likely imminent lawless action and thus regulable under Brandenburg v. Ohio. 1 13 Or maybe the regulation of some item of nonmisleading commercial advertising directly advances a substantial government interest in the least restrictive way possible, in which case the advertisement may be regulated in accordance with the test in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission. 14 But the fact that the tests in Brandenburg, New York Times, and Central Hudson are the ones to be applied reflects the coverage of the First Amendment. And because these First Amendment tests impose greater burdens than the negligible scrutiny of rationality review," the First Amendment makes a difference in the categories that it covers even when the particular speech that is a member of some covered category winds up unprotected.
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By contrast, no First Amendment-generated level of scrutiny is used to determine whether the content-based advertising restrictions of the Securities Act of 1933 are constitutional, whether corporate executives may be imprisoned under the Sherman Act for exchanging accurate information about proposed prices with their competitors, whether an organized crime leader may be prosecuted for urging that his subordinates murder a mob rival, or whether a chainsaw manufacturer may be held liable in a products liability action for injuries caused by mistakes in the written instructions accompanying the tool. Each of these examples involves some punishment for speech, and each involves liability based both on the content' 7 and on the communicative advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action').
13 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) . When the victim is neither a public official nor a public figure, the burden on a plaintiff lessens, but it still reflects the constraints of the First Amendment. 16 The distinction is especially visible in Canada, where the coverage of the right to "freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication" is specified in section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but the test for protection of covered activity is set forth in a separate section specifying that the rights covered shall be protected "subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." CAN [Vo1. 117:1765 impact 8 of the speech. And yet no First Amendment degree of scrutiny appears. In these and countless other instances, the permissibility of regulation -unlike the control of incitement, libel, and commercial advertisingis not measured against First Amendment-generated standards.
Securities violations, antitrust violations, criminal solicitation, and many other categories of "speech" remain uncovered by the First Amendment, and it is these uncovered categories that are our concern here. The circumstances under which the First Amendment actually protects covered speech are important, but this Article concerns itself with the logically prior and long-neglected issue of speech that is not encompassed by the First Amendment in the first place. The focus is on the domain in which the First Amendment is not even considered relevant to the case; in which an argument from the First Amendment would be seen as an argument from the wrong area of law; and in which, consequently, no First Amendment principle guards, even to a limited extent, against infringement. Questions about the boundaries of the First Amendment are not questions of strength -the degree of protection that the First Amendment offers -but rather are questions of scope -whether the First Amendment applies at all.
As noted above, the logical distinction between coverage and protection is pertinent to all constitutional rights -indeed, to all legal rules.
19 "Speed Limit 65," for example, is but shorthand for a rule, articulated more formally, that applies to particular persons driving on a particular stretch of highway, and that limits those persons' -and only those persons' -speed to sixty-five miles per hour. Elaborating the rule in full would expose the two parts, the first of which can be understood as a predicate -the scope of coverage -and the second as the consequent, such that application of the rule occurs only as a consequence of the predicate conditions being met. If you are driving a motor vehicle, and if you are not a police officer or driving an emergency vehicle, and if you are driving between these points on this highway -then you are prohibited from driving in excess of sixty-five miles per hour.
Constitutional rules can similarly be specified in if-then form. In much the same way, the coverage of the Eighth Amendment is substantially determined by whether something is a punishment, 26 an issue on which there is less disagreement than about, say, whether some action is a "search." We may often debate about which seizures are unreasonable and about which punishments are cruel and unusual, but disagreements about whether we are dealing with a seizure or a punishment are comparatively rare.
The scope of freedom of speech, however, is much harder to define. The First Amendment's coverage questions are difficult because the normal tools for delineating the coverage of a constitutional rule are 20 U.S. CONST distinction between coverage and protection should contemplate equal protection doctrine. Occasionally, as was notoriously the case in Korematsu, the Court will find that strict scrutiny is the applicable standard, but will consider the standard satisfied by the existence of a compelling governmental interest. The distinction between coverage and protection is the First Amendment analogue to the distinction between heightened and rational basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. There is a difference between cases in which strict scrutiny is inapplicable and cases in which strict scrutiny is applicable but satisfied. Similarly, the fact that defendants who are never prosecuted and defendants who are prosecuted but acquitted both get to walk the streets freely does not mean that there is no difference between the two -so too with the distinction between lack of coverage and coverage but nonprotection.
24 Much the same can be said about burden-of-proof rules. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required only in criminal cases, but because of the structure of our court system, the distinction between criminal and civil cases is not one that can be expected to generate any disagreement. If we had a court system in which civil and criminal actions were merged but in which the criminal portion required proof beyond a reasonable doubt while the civil portion required proof only by a preponderance of the evidence, the initial determination of which parts of the case were criminal (that is, the coverage of the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt rule) would be more visible. unavailing. Here the counterpart to "seizure" in the Fourth Amendment and "punishment" in the Eighth Amendment is "speech," a word that is of far less value in setting boundaries. "Speech" is what we use to enter into contracts, make wills, sell securities, warrant the quality of the goods we sell, fix prices, place bets, bid at auctions, enter into conspiracies, commit blackmail, threaten, give evidence at trials, and do most of the other things that occupy our days and occupy the courts. That the boundaries of the First Amendment are delineated by the ordinary language meaning of the word "speech" is simply implausible.
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The obvious rejoinder at this point is to object that the boundaries of the First Amendment are set not by the word "speech" standing alone, but by the words "the freedom of speech," because it is "the freedom of speech" and not "speech" that the First Amendment forbids Congress (and now the states 28 ) to abridge. But transforming the inquiry in this way does not solve the problem; it only exposes it. If the coverage of the First Amendment is determined by the meaning of "the freedom of speech," then we still need an explanation for why the speech with which we make contracts is, in general, not within the scope of "the freedom of speech" and thus not covered by the First Amendment, but the speech with which we urge civil disobedience is, in general, part of "the freedom of speech" and thus covered. Now, at this juncture, we could consult history, original intentions, moral theory, tradition, or any of the other conventional, albeit contested, sources of constitutional guidance; but let us postpone that inquiry. For present purposes, the important task is to identify boundary disputes as disputes not about the protection of the First Amendment, but about its coverage. To be sure, the formal structure of the distinction between coverage and protection can be formulated in different ways. First, though, it is important to recognize that the distinction exists. For now, the primary point is that the strictures of the First Amendment plainly apply not only to a subset of all legal controversies, but also to a subset of those legal controversies involving what would be called "speech" in ordinary language. The focus of the current inquiry is how this latter subset comes to be defined 29 29 Although the distinction between coverage and protection is a formal one concerning the logic of rules, and although coverage and protection are importantly distinct as a conceptual matter, it may well be that actual decisions about coverage are made with ultimate questions of protection in mind. One of the worries about First Amendment coverage for commercial advertising, for example, is that including commercial advertising within the coverage of the First Amend-First Amendment cases from other cases involving words, language, communication, and expression.
III. THE VISIBLE BOUNDARIES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S HISTORY
A few disputes about the boundaries of the First Amendment have been highly visible, and a quick survey will set the stage for exploring those areas that are even more significant precisely because they have been taken for granted.
The most notorious of the First Amendment's visibly contested boundary disputes has been about obscenity. 30 For much of the First Amendment's history, both legislation restricting obscenity and individual prosecutions for trafficking in obscene materials were explicitly treated as beyond the First Amendment's borders simply because of the category in which the restriction or prosecution was placed. When in the nineteenth century the Supreme Court offhandedly dismissed suggestions that the First Amendment might preclude obscenity prosecutions, 3 it did so not by reasoning that particular publications presented dangers sufficient to override the First Amendment, but by treating the First Amendment as no more applicable to obscenity prosecutions than to prosecutions for assault -in neither instance would the government's action even bring the First Amendment into play.
Although the Court in 1957 finally acknowledged that obscenity proceedings could touch on free speech concerns when restricting parment might exert downward pressure on the degree of protection of covered speech in general, thus producing less protection for core political and ideological speech. 33 it still insisted that works actually determined to be obscene according to First Amendment-shaped standards lay outside the coverage of the First Amendment. 34 By proceeding in this manner, the Court -mistakenly, in the eyes of all but a handful of commentators 35 -avoided subjecting the rationales for obscenity regulation to anything more than rational basis review.
3 6 Though these rationales seem tenuous even to those who are sympathetic, excluding obscenity from First Amendment coverage enabled the Court to treat obscenity control as no more subject to First Amendment standards than the regulation of pushcart vendors in New Orleans 37 or opticians in Oklahoma 38 (to take two cases in which state regulatory schemes based on highly dubious justifications were saved only by the stunningly minimal nature of rational basis review).
The continuing objections to the Supreme Court's approach to obscenity are premised on the view that even materials found to be legally obscene under the test later crystallized in Miller v. California 39 ought to be within the reach of the First Amendment. To most commentators, the fact that legally obscene materials remain outside the First Amendment is inconsistent with the fact that certain other categories of speech that were once outside the reach of the First Amendment are now wholly within its grasp. Defamation, for example, was formerly not covered, with the Supreme Court declaring in i952 that libel was one of "certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem." 40 (1985) . Yet if the independent-review standard were to be applied to misleading advertising, most of the work of the Federal Trade Commission, for example, would be subject to independent constitutional appellate review, something that has not happened and is not likely to happen. As long as this state of affairs persists, the regulation of misleading commercial advertising will be analogous to pre-Roth obscenity law, with the nature of the proceeding rather than the actual falsity (or obscenity) of the material determining noncoverage. the fact that it demands more heightened scrutiny than simple rationality review shows that commercial advertising now falls within the scope of the First Amendment.
Finally, we have "fighting words." When the Supreme Court in 1942 upheld Walter Chaplinsky's conviction for delivering a vituperative public speech against religion and then harshly denouncing the police officers who sought to control him, 50 Justice Murphy's opinion for a unanimous Court rejected Chaplinsky's First Amendment argument by saying, in now-famous words, that the "classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem," included "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words -those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.1 5 1 To the Court, the fighting words Chaplinsky uttered were regulable not because the state interest in controlling them was so powerful as to trump the First Amendment, but because the words lay entirely outside the scope of the First Amendment.
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Subsequent developments have narrowed the class of fighting words considerably, 53 but at least in theory, the Supreme Court still does not view the presence of "words" as a sufficient condition for testing the regulation of fighting words against First Amendment standards.
IV. BEYOND THE BORDER: THE DOMAIN OF THE BARELY CONTESTED
There are those who appear to believe that the aforementioned exclusions, whether still good law or not, represent the universe of speech lying outside the First Amendment.
5 4 Yet to take that position is to be afflicted with the common ailment of spending too much time with the casebooks -defining the domain of constitutional permissibility by reference to those matters that have been considered viable enough to 50 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569-70, 574 (1942).
51 Id. at 571-72. 52 Chaplinsky is not quite as clean a case on this score as the obscenity cases, because the Chaplinsky language makes reference both to the degree of the injury and to the lack of First Amendment value. See id. at 571-73. It is thus unclear whether the Court's threshold evaluation of the harm of fighting words, and thus of the strength of the state's interest in controlling them, was an application of First Amendment standards. In the obscenity, commercial advertising, and defamation cases, by contrast, the initial determination that the speech was not covered by the First Amendment was seemingly made solely on the basis of the absence of First Amendment value, without regard to the strength of the state's interest in regulation.
53 A prime example of speech residing almost imperceptibly outside the First Amendment's boundaries is the speech that is the primary target of federal securities regulation. It might be hyperbole to describe the Securities and Exchange Commission as the Content Regulation Commission, but such a description would not be wholly inaccurate. 5 6 When exercising its authority under the Securities Act of i933, 5 7 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 5 and various other statutes regulating the securities markets, the SEC engages in pervasive content-based control over speech. Under the registration provisions of the 1933 Act, securities may be neither offered nor sold without registration, except under narrowly defined circumstances typically reserved for small offerings. 5 9 And as the registration provisions operate in practice, neither offers nor advertisements may be made, published, or delivered without advance approval by the SEC -approval contingent upon the Commission's determination that the materials are neither false nor misleading. 60 Even after registration has been completed, SEC civil and criminal enforcement actions, 6 1 as well as pri- to a company's securities are written and distributed under the threat of sanction for false, misleading, or omitted disclosure. Much the same is true of the highly controlled world of proxy solicitation. Although a proxy contest is an election, it is an election in which what the candidates can say -and when and to whom they can say it -is tightly constrained by the 1934 Act and the regulations promulgated pursuant to it. As with its control of registration under the 1933 Act, the SEC is concerned with whether the materials used in the proxy process are false or misleading -even when the grounds for a proxy challenge are explicitly political -and equally with the timing and style of the communications. 63 Because a persistent issue in proxy contests is the ability of management to control the channels of communication with shareholders, much of the regulatory activity, occasionally litigated, revolves around the demands of corporate pirates and dissident shareholders to compel management to distribute, as an accompaniment to management's own materials, literature and statements directly opposed to management's positions. 64 Although content regulation in the world of securities regulation is not limited to the registration and proxy processes (prohibitions on insider trading typically sanction the transmission of accurate inside information from "tipper" to "tippee"), the above description is sufficient to make the point: restrictions and requirements that in other contexts would set off a host of First Amendment alarm bells -prior restraint by virtue of mandatory government approval in advance of publication, 65 Until the assimilation of commercial speech into the First Amendment, it would scarcely have occurred to anyone that the First Amendment could be relevant to securities regulation. For a few years after Virginia Pharmacy, 70 however, things were quite different. Starting in the early i98os, claims that the entire scheme of securities regulation needed to be tested against First Amendment standards became more common.
7 1 Some of these claims were made by academics, but others were made in domains inhabited by practicing lawyers. Indeed, James Goodale, an influential Wall Street lawyer with a substantial media practice, ominously announced in 1983 that securities regulation and the First Amendment were on a "[c]ollision [c]ourse. ''72 The collision never happened. Although the Supreme Court and the lower courts occasionally brandished the First Amendment when securities regulation appeared to trench upon the editorial content of newspapers and newsletters 73 or upon the behavior of journalists 7 4 a frontal First Amendment assault on the securities regulation system never got off the ground. The few court challenges that were mounted appear not to have succeeded, even in lower courts. 75 Today, a quarter of a century after the first warnings were sounded and twenty years after those warnings were loudest, securities regulation goes on as before, remaining a domain largely outside the coverage of the First Amendment.
69 See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 38-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 70 
BOUNDARIES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The story of the First Amendment and antitrust is similar but less overt. There are many ways to violate the Sherman Act, 7 6 the Clayton Act, 7 7 the Federal Trade Commission Act, 7 8 and the other sources of American antitrust regulation; but most of the effective ones involve speech. Fixing prices is typically facilitated by the transfer of accurate information; yet were the president of the Ford Motor Company to convey to the president of General Motors entirely accurate information about Ford's proposed prices for the forthcoming model year, the consequences would more likely be treble damages and time in the penitentiary than praise for contributing to the marketplace of ideas. So too with organizing a boycott -an effective method of attracting the attention of the Justice Department and class action lawyerseven though another way of describing a boycott is as advocacy of the virtues of collective action. Indeed, the very language of the Sherman
7 9 -appears to anticipate that many anticompetitive practices will occur as a result of the verbal or written exchange of information.
Like securities regulation, antitrust law has occasionally been checked by the First Amendment when it has invaded traditional First Amendment domains, as with concerted action to urge legislation (the so-called Noerr-Pennington doctrine 8°) or with otherwise unlawful boycotts that are more political than economic in motivation., Apart from such rare exceptions, however, antitrust law restricts the exchange of accurate market, pricing, and production information, as well as limits the advocacy of concerted action in most contexts;
8 2 yet it remains almost wholly untouched by the First Amendment. 83 As early as 192 i, Oliver Wendell Holmes found the constitutional acceptability of these antitrust restrictions "surprising in a country of free 76 15 U.S.C. § § i-7 (2000 most of labor law proceeds unimpeded by the First Amendment. 8 9 Perhaps because of organized labor's crucial role in the formative years of modern First Amendment thinking, 90 the relative invisibility of labor law in First Amendment doctrine has been the subject of considerable commentary 9 ' -but to little avail. Although a good deal of labor law is about managing the speech that takes place in union certification and representation elections, the law permits content-based management of elections and election campaigns -including restrictions on accurate representations by employers about the future consequences of unionization -to an extent that would never be counte- nanced in domains covered by the First Amendment. 9 2 Moreover, much of the balance of modern labor law involves unashamedly content-based restrictions on boycotts, strikes, and picketing. In some contexts unions may say and do things that employers may not, and in other contexts employers may say and do things that unions may not -the two schemes together constituting a complex but content-based system of government regulation of speech.
Expressions of concern about the absence of First Amendment analysis in the development of labor law, frequent in the I98os, 93 have largely disappeared, perhaps because of a recognition that the Supreme Court would not be sympathetic to these concerns, or perhaps because of a fear that the Supreme Court would be too sympathetic. Whatever the reasons, however, the objections have faded away, and much of labor law retains its position as an outsider to the First Amendment.
The history of securities regulation, antitrust law, and labor law has been replicated in numerous other domains. Copyright law, especially recently, has been the subject of some criticism, but its pervasive regime of content regulation and prior restraint remains largely unimpeded by the First Amendment. 94 So too with the law of sexual harassment, which, in both its quid pro quo and hostile-environment aspects, regulates speech, but which, with Supreme Court approval 95 and occasional anguish by commentators, 96 If we do not restrict our inquiry to propositional speech -that is, if we include the speech by which we make wills, enter into contracts, render verdicts, create conspiracies, consecrate marriages, admit to our crimes, post warnings, and do much else -it becomes still clearer that the speech with which the First Amendment is even slightly concerned is but a small subset of the speech that pervades every part of our lives. 29-33, 68 (1969) . The classic examples of performative utterances include saying "I do" at a wedding, writing "I bequeath" in a will, or declaring "Guilty" at a trial.
V. OUTCOMES IN SEARCH OF
[Vol. ) the doctrine now covers pornography, commercial advertising, and art, inter alia -none of which has much to do with political deliberation or self-governance, except under such an attenuated definition of "political" that the justification's core loses much of its power.
0 6 "Search for truth" or "marketplace of ideas" accounts 1 0 7 are similarly at a loss to explain the coverage of utterances without much truth value, including self-expression generally and the self-expressive aspects of most art and literature in particular. Indeed, if we were concerned about actually increasing knowledge and exposing error, it is far from clear that we would so easily protect both communication that is largely emotive and communication that is demonstrably factually false. Personal autonomy and self-expression accounts of the First Amendment are also difficult to justify descriptively. For these theories, the inclusion of commercial speech and noncommercial corporate speech is problematic, 1 0 8 since it is not clear whose autonomy or self-expression is fostered as a result; equally prob- lematic is the inclusion of plainly harmful speech, for it is not normally thought that rights to autonomy and self-expression extend to the right to injure others. 1 0 9
Not only are existing normative theories substantially narrower in some respects than current doctrine, but in other respects they are also substantially broader. "Distrust of government" theories, 1 10 for example, cannot explain why that distrust has not been extended to the SEC, the FTC, the FDA, the Justice Department, or judges managing a trial -all of which involve government officials making contentbased decisions about speech, and none of which is now covered by the First Amendment.
Thus ons of statutory construction, 18 the proliferation of available First Amendment normative theories produces a universe in which the actual grounds for inclusion and exclusion remain successfully camouflaged.
That the existing justifications for a free speech principle cannot individually or collectively explain the First Amendment's development does not imply that the theories are inadequate as normative accounts of the idea of free speech. Still, it remains the case that although theories of the First Amendment's domain have proliferated, and although the full proliferation of these theories has been utilized by the courts, it does not follow that one or a small number of those theories can function as a descriptive account of the First Amendment's boundaries.
The fact that even the best of the currently available normative accounts diverges so substantially from existing doctrine, and thus from the shape of the First Amendment as we know it, means that if we are looking to explain this existing terrain -rather than prescribe what it ideally should look like -then it would be fruitful to look elsewhere. To put it differently, existing normative theories seem of little relevance to achieving a descriptive understanding of how the First Amendment came to look the way it does" 9 and of how it came to include what it includes and exclude what it excludes. In light of this failure of normative free speech theory to explain the existing shape of the First Amendment, it may be more promising to shift course and consider the possibility that the most logical explanation of the actual boundaries of the First Amendment might come less from an underlying theory of the First Amendment and more from the political, sociological, cultural, historical, psychological, and economic milieu in which the First Amendment exists and out of which it has developed.
VI. THE MAGNETISM OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
If we abandon -at least here -the pursuit of a normative theory of inclusion and exclusion, and instead seek description or explanation, our search may be more revealing. So rather than supposing that the domain of the actual First Amendment has been inscribed by its purposes, functions, or philosophical explanations, let us examine the political, social, cultural, historical, psychological, and economic functionings of the First Amendment in society. When we define our task in this way -as exploring the political psychology of the First Amendment -we obtain a better picture of why the First Amendment notices what it actually notices, and perhaps more significantly, why it ignores what it ignores. Accordingly, I will suggest that the coverage of the First Amendment 120 is best understood as the outcome of a competitive struggle among numerous interests for constitutional attention' 2 ' and that the factors determining the winners in this competition for constitutional salience are worth not only closer inspection, but the kind of systematic research I can only hint at here.
Although I mean to focus on those domains of speech that the First Amendment has not covered and still does not cover, understanding the dynamics of the First Amendment's remaining noncoverage of vast areas of speech requires exploring how the First Amendment has come to cover as much as it does. For once we see that most of the expansion of the First Amendment beyond its theoretical or historical core is a function of largely nondoctrinal forces, we can see as well that the 120 Although some might think that the explanations to follow apply to questions of protection as well as of coverage, thus making the distinction between coverage and protection unnecessary, such an interpretation would be more extravagant than can be supported. My argument, more modest but more accurate than a full Legal Realist account of First Amendment adjudication would offer, is decidedly not a denial that questions of protection within the domains of coverage can be substantially, albeit not completely, explained by current First Amendment doctrine. Once we recognize that the First Amendment is the area of law with which we are dealing, legal doctrine appears to do a considerable amount of real work. But neither the doctrine nor free speech theory appears to do much, if anything, to explain when First Amendment law applies in the first place. What I offer here is thus a largely nondoctrinal account of the ambit of coverage -an account not inconsistent with a largely doctrinal explanation of the level and type of protection applied within that ambit of coverage.
121 . The constitutional agenda is potentially different insofar as an issue will not appear to the judge of a court with mandatory jurisdiction as a matter involving an agenda, but rather as one requiring a decision. Nevertheless, the scarce resource model is still applicable in terms of attracting public attention to sponsor and support litigation, attracting the interest of advocacy organizations, influencing which cases courts take seriously and which they do not, and, of course, determining which cases are heard and which are not through courts' discretionary jurisdiction. I same forces determine much of the distinction between the covered and the noncovered. All cultures have their quasi-authoritative symbols, metaphors, and ideas; 123 and understanding a society's rhetorical terrain requires understanding how public actors seek to appropriate those symbols, metaphors, and ideas to their own causes.1 24 Indeed, the nondisciplined nature of American politics may make the political contest for symbols more important than in more disciplined parliamentary systems.1 2 Occasionally these symbols are negativeCommunism, Prohibition, Munich -and political actors seek to dissociate themselves from symbols that recall failed policies or great evils. More often, however, those who influence and make policy compete to claim various positive symbols. A symbol might be a historical era, such as the founding period of the United States, the creation of the State of Israel, the U.S. civil rights movement, or South Africa's transformation from apartheid. Symbols might be particular individuals, such as Thomas Jefferson, 26 Abraham Lincoln, Chairman Mao, or Nelson Mandela. They might be physical artifacts, like the flag or the cross; or they might be abstract ideas, like rights or equality; or they might be books, such as the Koran or the Bible. When Antonio in The Merchant of Venice observes that even "the devil can cite Scripture for his purpose,"' 27 he refers not only to the linguistic indeterminacy of the Bible, but also to how its rhetorical authority leads 122 The First Amendment's magnetism generates the phenomenon on the part of legal and pub- participants in social and political discussions to strive constantly to enlist it in their causes.
In important respects, the First Amendment appears to serve a similar function in American society. To an extent unmatched in a world that often views America's obsession with free speech as reflecting an insensitive neglect of other important conflicting values, 128 the First Amendment, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press provide considerable rhetorical power and argumentative authority. 1 
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The individual or group on the side of free speech often seems to believe, and often correctly, that it has secured the upper hand in public debate. The First Amendment not only attracts attention, but also strikes fear in the hearts of many who do not want to be seen as opposing the freedoms it enshrines.
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The reasons why the First Amendment has these effects are undoubtedly diverse and complex. One such reason might be that events of dissent and protest, and thus of freedom of speech and press -the Boston Tea Party, John Peter Zenger, Thomas Paine, John Brown, the origins of the labor movement, and the civil rights movement in the i96os -have pride of place in the popular conception of American history. Another might be the belief that the First Amendment was first because it was most important, rather than because, as was actually the case, it moved from third to first after the first two amendments failed to secure ratification. 131 179' positive and negative, policy and principle, 13 2 dimensions. Freedom of speech, however, while in theory definable both positively and negatively, has in reality developed more negatively -understood to be at its core about protecting against danger rather than about making conditions better. 133 Given that fears tend to be retransmitted more than hopes, competition to claim the mantle of the First Amendment, especially in a country where citizens may harbor more distrust of government than most other places in the world, 134 is predictably fierce.
Such possible explanations for the First Amendment's magnetism likely have at least some explanatory force, yet in the complex array of reasons why the First Amendment has become one of the symbols that opposing political forces fight to claim, a principal one is surely that relying on the First Amendment is, not surprisingly, a good way of attracting the attention and sympathy of the press. 135 If, as the literature on agenda-setting tells us, press attention is a major factor in moving issues from the back burner to the front 136 135 There is a debate in the literature about the extent to which interest groups can attract the attention of the press directly, rather than through mobilizing the public. Compare JEFFREY M. (1999) (discussing the ways interest group mobilization can attract press interest), with TIMOTHY E. (1972) . Regardless, it seems a plausible hypothesis that press interest is more likely to be piqued by press-related issues than by issues in which the press is not itself an interested participant. 137 then the shrewd interest group 138 or public advocate will attempt to devise a strategy to attract press attention. Accordingly, claiming the support of -or even better, the presence of a threat to -the First Amendment is often a wise course of action.' 39 Because the press is not nearly as disinterested an observer of First Amendment controversies as it is of constitutional issues involving due process, equal protection, federalism, or 
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139 A search of all newspaper articles in the LEXIS "News" database, conducted on February 17, 2003, and encompassing the last two years, is instructive: "New York Times and first amendment" revealed 2997 instances, and coupling "New York Times" with "freedom of speech or free speech" exceeded 3000. By contrast, coupling "New York Times" with "fourth amendment" produced 284 references, "fifth amendment" 657, "equal protection" 404, "fourteenth amendment" 208, and "due process" 12o8. The results substituting "Boston Globe" for "New York Times" were similar, with 603 "First Amendment" references compared to 317 for "due process," 123 for "fifth amendment," 64 for "equal protection," 51 for "fourth amendment," and 23 for "fourteenth amendment." And substituting "Washington Post" produced 2273 for "free speech or freedom of speech" and 2164 for "first amendment," but only 853 for "due process," 490 for "fifth amendment," 278 for "equal protection," 195 for "fourth amendment," and 113 for "fourteenth amendment." Significantly, there is no indication that these disparities in press attention simply mirror underlying disparities in the number of controversies; for the dockets of the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, and the state courts all show a pattern in which the number of First Amendment cases is roughly equivalent to the number of equal protection and due process cases, and in which the number of criminal procedure cases vastly exceeds any other category of constitutional controversy. 1994) . Nor is there any indication that the disparities in press attention reflect disparities in the underlying importance of the cases, because other measures of case importance -discussion in the annual Supreme Court issue of the Harvard Law Review, for example -do not show anything like the obsession with the First Amendment that the above numbers reveal about the institutional press. For the same ten-year period, the Review committed 268 out of its 2291 total pages devoted to "Leading Cases," slightly less than twelve percent, to freedom of speech and freedom of the press cases.
the rights of criminal defendants, for example, a First Amendment argument has a special resonance with the very people who substantially influence which topics will become public and which will not. Somewhat more debatably, a disproportionate interest in the First Amendment may exist within the larger intellectual milieu that encompasses, in addition to the press, the worlds of education, academic research, the professions, and perhaps most importantly, the law, including the judiciary. 40 In part because of their own beliefs, and in part because they are unlikely to be totally unconcerned with what is said about them in the press,1 4 1 judges are also likely to be, or at least to seem to be, disproportionately sympathetic to First Amendment arguments.
These empirical assertions are testable and possibly false, but they do seem to explain a substantial part of the magnetic effect of the First Amendment: the way in which legal and constitutional arguments migrate to claims of freedom of speech and press. Time and again, legal arguments that initially appear to have little to do with free speech turn up in First Amendment clothing, far more often than free speech arguments turn up in, say, equal protection clothing. 142 Objections to the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy are framed not primarily as arguments about equality, about sexual orientation as a potentially suspect or quasi-suspect class, or even about personal liberty. Rather, the "Don't Tell" dimension is used to portray the policy as a free speech problem more than, or at least as well as, an equality or personal liberty problem. 
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Similarly, objections to government regulation of business that were originally based on concern for economic liberty have become objections to the regulation of commercial advertising, 144 just as objections to hostile-environment sexual harassment law on the ground of alleged intrusiveness have become objections to regulating speech in the workplace. 145 The anti-Microsoft and anti-Hollywood claims of the open-source movement focus on the way in which computer source codes can be conceived of as a language and therefore as speech; 146 equality and dignity objections to the (mis)treatment of the homeless become First Amendment arguments for the right to beg; 147 and the sexual liberty and antipaternalism claims of those who object to laws restricting sexual conduct typically focus on those aspects of the sex industry -nude dancing, most obviously -that can be conceptualized as involving free speech issues.
14 8 Indeed, even businesses claiming a share of the money raised from antidumping tariffs have managed to translate their arguments into First Amendment language.' 4 9
In these and numerous other instances, the First Amendment's magnetism leads strategic actors to embrace it as easily as politicians embrace motherhood, the flag, and apple pie. As Professor Carol Steiker observes, when those opposed to so-called "identity politics" wished to shore up their objections to hate crime laws, they latched on to tenuous First Amendment "content neutrality" arguments -with some political if not doctrinal success -in order to mask the extent to which hate crime laws were situated well within the nonproblematic traditions of the criminal law.' 50 And when his advisors were discussing the controversy about sampling versus "actual" enumeration with respect to the 2000 Census, President Clinton suggested, by all ac-counts with a straight face, that the administration's position on sampling be characterized in First Amendment terms. Clinton expressly added that doing so would likely generate press sympathy for the position.' 1 5 This tactic turned out to be too much of a reach, but even the suggestion reinforces the view that using the First Amendment for non-First-Amendment-y claims is not infrequently a subject of speculation by those who wish to affect public opinion, especially among elite segments of society.
The magnetic force of the First Amendment is likely to generate two different consequences. First, actors (not including the courts) in the public arena can be expected to rely on the First Amendment in pressing their causes -believing, often justifiably, that doing so will attract allies, generate favorable attention by the press, and arouse sympathy from other actors. Second, lawyers representing clients with claims and causes not necessarily lying within the First Amendment's traditional concerns have reason to add First Amendment arguments to their core claims, or to modify their core claims to connect them with First Amendment arguments, in the hope that doing so will increase the probability of success.
These two predicted consequences of the First Amendment's magnetism are distinct but connected. From the perspective of an interest group using the First Amendment to launch or reinforce its public arguments, the public attention that the First Amendment attracts will likely make a First Amendment claim more appealing to a lawyer and more plausible, or at least less frivolous, to a judge than other legal claims would be. In this respect, using the First Amendment as public rhetorical strategy may both fuel litigation and increase the likelihood of its success. Moreover, by tapping into the media's and the public's well-documented interest in conflict,' 5 2 litigation will attract more press and public attention than would raising a nonlitigated or nonconflictual policy question on the same issue involving the same parties.' 53 When taken together, therefore, the two phenomena reinforce each other and produce an environment in which the magnetic force of the First Amendment attracts topics and claims that would otherwise be beyond the First Amendment's boundaries, and in which that litigation then attracts a degree of press, public, and interest-group attention that further contributes to the First Amendment's magnetic force. This cycle can be expected to bring issues into the First Amendment that previously had been outside its domain, but no equivalent force pushes out those issues that had previously been inside. 154 The consequence is considerable outward pressure on the boundaries of the First Amendment.
This outward pressure is increased to the extent that courts themselves engage in the same form of First Amendment opportunism as do advocates and interest groups. When courts, having reached their decisions, need to choose among various plausible justifications for those decisions, they not surprisingly reach for justifications with greater persuasive appeal, even controlling for the degree of actual precedential support for their decisions. A Supreme Court deciding to rule in favor of easier ballot access, for example, would likely be able to rely on the Equal Protection Clause, could resort to the Elections Clause of Article I, and might even consider rehabilitating the Guaranty Clause;1 5 5 but the way in which ballot access opinions migrate to 154 This exposes a larger issue: how the relative absence of interest groups urging the constriction rather than the expansion of the First Amendment affects First Amendment doctrine generally. The reasons for this phenomenon are complex, but a few possibilities are worth mentioning. One is that the existence of a contingent-fee system for attorneys representing plaintiffs in tort liability cases, as well as the relative lack of plaintiff classes (as opposed to individual plaintiffs) in libel cases, against the background of strongly press-protective libel and privacy laws, has stifled the development of a plaintiff's libel or privacy bar, despite there being a strong libel and privacy defense bar. And because those whose privacy is invaded or whose reputation is damaged by the media are rarely repeat players, the fact that there are few repeat-player plaintiffs and few repeatplayer plaintiffs' attorneys is likely to make challenges to existing doctrine less organized and thus less powerful. More broadly, it may be that First Amendment questions are such that the paucity of repeat players injured by speech is a phenomenon that exists across most domains of the First Amendment. It is true that on specific issues, even if not on issues such as defamation, there are single-issue groups or single-issue movements concerned with increasing the scope of government power and decreasing the constraints of the First Amendment. We see this with pornography and obscenity, with flag desecration, and with many dimensions of national security. Yet what is illuminating is that these are groups and movements focused on a specific issue or a small cluster of issues. We do not see groups urging the constriction of the First Amendment in as broad-based a way as we see groups like the American Civil Liberties Union, People for the American Way, the Association of American Booksellers, and the American Society of Newspaper Editors defending the current understanding of the First Amendment and even urging its expansion. A full account of the political economy of the First Amendment would examine this topic systematically and would explore carefully the extent to which First Amendment issues, more than many others, are ones in which repeat players and other aggregations of influence are arrayed substantially more on one side of a constitutional right than on the other. the no-less-but-no-more-plausible First Amendment rather than to these other not implausible routes to the same result suggests that the rhetorical power of the First Amendment exists both within and without the domain of judicial decisionmaking.' 56 Often, of course, the attraction of the First Amendment will arise simply because the most logical doctrinal support would need to surmount substantial procedural or precedential obstacles, as with the Court's preference for First Amendment rather than economic liberty arguments in Virginia Pharmacy;' 5 7 but just as often the preference seems more strategic than doctrinal. In such cases, courts behave like others who seek to persuade, recognizing that relying on the First Amendment is often a wise strategy even when it is not the most direct source of doctrinal support.
The First Amendment's magnetism is part of a larger dynamic pushing the boundaries of the First Amendment generally outward. Although there are no data that would support more than a loose impression, one can say with some confidence that courts rarely find stretched First Amendment claims to be frivolous.' 5 8 One reason for this might be that the capacious language of the First Amendment, the indeterminacy of the First Amendment's purposes, and the omnipresence of speech (in the ordinary language meaning of the word) combine to produce a world in which it would be extremely difficult to dismiss almost any First Amendment claim as wildly implausible. So even if we believe that there are "off the wall" or frivolous claims with respect to many statutes, some common law doctrines, and some constitutional provisions, 5 9 and even if we believe that whether a claim is deemed frivolous is at least partly a function of the effect of traditional legal materials such as texts and precedents and documented original intentions, it is possible that the First Amendment does not fit this mold. It may be the case that judges -even if they feel no greater intrinsic sympathy for First Amendment claims than for the universe of legal or constitutional claims generally, and even if they make no attempt to reach decisions that would be publicly, politically, or journalistically well received -would be especially reluctant to dismiss First Amendment claims as frivolous even when they border on frivolity according to existing doctrine and existing First Amendment traditions. To the extent that this is so, there will be outward pressure on the boundaries of the First Amendment both in the courts and outside of them.
In addition to the properties of First Amendment claims that may make them less likely to appear legally frivolous, the First Amendment's magnetism may assist in ensuring that those claims will not arise in isolation. There will often be multiple lawyers, multiple litigants, and multiple public actors who perceive the virtues of the same opportunistic strategy at roughly the same time, or who even may be in active coordination with each other -as with the multiple challenges to the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, the proliferation of First Amendment rhetoric surrounding legal arguments regarding computer source code, and the panoply of parallel claims about First Amendment limitations on copyright. When this is the case, the multiplicity of individually tenuous claims may produce a cascade effect 160 such that the claims no longer appear tenuous. make all these individually implausible claims seem more credible than they actually are.' 6 1 From the standpoint of an interest group seeking to achieve change and to mobilize public support or the support of other interest groups, 16 1 winning is better than losing publicly, but losing publicly is perhaps still preferable to being ignored.
Once the claim or argument achieves a critical mass of plausibility, the game may be over. Even if individual courts reject the claim, the multiplicity of now-plausible claims may give the issue what is referred to in inside-the-Beltway political jargon as "traction" and in newsroom jargon as "legs. 1 64 has slowed the momentum of those who would wage serious First Amendment battle against hostileenvironment sexual harassment law. 165 Similarly, decades of judicial rejection of the argument that copyright law must be substantially restricted by the commands of the First Amendment have scarcely discouraged those who urge otherwise; and in some respects the Supreme Court's recent decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft 166 can be considered not a defeat, but rather one further step toward the entry of copyright into the domain of the First Amendment: the Supreme Court did grant certiorari, in part to determine "whether . . . the extension of existing and future copyrights violates the First Amendment; 1 67 and the sevenJustice majority, as well as Justice Breyer in dissent,1 6 acknowledged that the First Amendment was not totally irrelevant.
161 Indeed, this dynamic appears to explain the current movement with respect to copyright and the First Amendment, see sources cited supra note i, and the previous movement with respect to First Amendment challenges to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," see sources cited supra note 143. 168 See id. at 8oi (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The Copyright Clause and the First Amendment seek related objectives -the creation and dissemination of information.").
In order to understand the occasional but curious persistence of First Amendment arguments even after authoritative rejection, we should take seriously the possibility that those who continue to press such claims are being entirely rational. We and they certainly know that courts change their position, and we and they also know that the pressures on the boundaries of the First Amendment are typically outward. As a result, a judicial defeat may be perceived as but a temporary impediment, or perhaps even as a way of attracting additional attention -attention that may itself have litigation advantages. Consider, for example, the existing research on decisions by the Supreme Court to grant certiorari: If it is the case, as several studies have shown, that the very existence of amici increases the probability that certiorari will be granted, 69 then the ability to mobilize the kinds of interest groups -many with small staffs and few resources -who would file amicus briefs is of crucial importance in determining which cases will be heard and which will not, and thus is instrumental in laying the path of constitutional law. And if what this research shows about the certiorari process is relevant to the case selection process and to the setting of judicial agendas generally, it may be that the existence of persistent interests in limitations on copyright and persistent interests in limitations on the use of hostile-environment sexual harassment law may turn out to explain more about the shape of the First Amendment than do the (current) judicial rejections of those claims. And it is to hypothesize as well that the explanation for what is ultimately treated as covered by the First Amendment and what ultimately remains uncovered appears to be the result of a highly complex array of factors, some of which are doctrinal but many of which are not. Although these factors may not be susceptible to systematic ranking, a look at the wider domain of inclusions and exclusions from the coverage of the First Amendment reveals a list of the factors that appear to make a difference. More importantly, examination of these factors may help to explain why, even if not inevitably and even if not permanently, so much speech continues to remain outside the First Amendment. The First Amendment's magnetism and the consequent opportunism of legal and political actors may explain much of the First Amendment's invasiveness -both the corollary and the consequence of its expansion -but we need to look elsewhere to see why that expansion is not infinite.
A useful place to begin is the criminal law, for this is an area in which numerous verbal acts stand far outside the purview of the First Amendment. In his landmark analysis of the absence of First Amendment coverage in numerous verbal aspects of criminal law -most notably criminal conspiracy and criminal solicitation, but also various other forms of verbal participation in and facilitation of crime -Kent Greenawalt identifies a number of factors that bear upon why this absence occurs. 170 We can identify four issues mentioned by Greenawalt that seem noteworthy and that are especially important for our purposes. Thus, it might be reasonable to interpret Greenawalt as suggesting that when the defendant's speech is public rather than face-toface, when it is inspired by the speaker's desire for social change rather than for private gain, when it relates to something general rather than to a specific transaction, and when it is normative rather than informational in content, the First Amendment plainly appears to be implicated.' 7 1 Conversely, therefore, when speech is face-to-face, informational, particular, and for private gain, the implication would be that the First Amendment is irrelevant. So when Susan whispers to Max that the combination to the office safe is "22 left, 14 right, 37 left," the ability to prosecute Susan for being an accessory based solely on her verbal behavior, even though it is the communication of accurate information to a willing recipient, is unconstrained by the First Amendment because Susan's words are private, informational, specific, and devoted solely to private gain. But speech to an audience in Central Park urging his listeners to rob banks in order to finance the revolution, the public, noninformational, and ideological nature of this speech brings the First Amendment -specifically Brandenburg -into play.
Although Greenawalt addresses only the criminal law, many of the factors I understand him to be highlighting might also apply in the civil realm, especially with respect to tort liability on the basis of print or broadcast materials.
1 7 2 As with criminal conspiracy and criminal solicitation, here again the universe of First Amendment-free liability is huge. Liability for misleading instructions, maps, and formulas, for example, is generally (and silently) understood not to raise First Amendment issues. 177 the covered profit-seeking speech in the commercial speech cases, and the covered particular speech in most libel cases. Conversely, noncovered cases exist for each of the supposed indicia of coverage -including the noncovered public speech in securities offerings, the noncovered ideological speech in cases involving ideological solicitation to crime, 178 the noncovered noninformational advocacy in the same cases, and the noncovered general speech in cases involving maps and plans. Although each of the factors is nondispositive and not a strict test for coverage or noncoverage, these examples suggest that the indicia for coverage versus noncoverage may include factors other than those suggested by Greenawalt -very likely nondoctrinal ones. And because questions of noncoverage have rarely been before the courts -courts declining to extend coverage have almost always, as with the sexual harassment cases, done so with virtually no explanation -we are left to speculate about the reasons for noncoverage and to infer the pattern of noncoverage more from the legal system's silence than from its words.
One possible nondoctrinal factor helping to explain judicial determinations or social understandings of noncoverage may be the existence of a sympathetic litigant or class of litigants. Although the history of First Amendment doctrine has been, as is well documented, forged by some "not very nice people"' 1 7 9 -Clarence Brandenburg, 1 8 0 Frank Collin,181 Jay Near, 18 2 Robert Welch,' 183 and Larry Flynt, 18 4 for example -the standard account that First Amendment doctrine and coverage have been built on a foundation of such undesirables may be a misleading oversimplification. 185 Indeed, it may simply be false. 18 6 If we look at the cases in which the First Amendment has been taken in a genuinely new direction or has been brought into a novel arena, the chief protagonist has rarely been as unappealing as those on the foregoing list. More often, the litigants at the forefront of genuine First Amendment breakthroughs have been either individually sympathetic or at least have been parties that the courts (and some of the public) were likely to perceive as having been unduly or unfairly per-' secuted. Not only was libel brought into the First Amendment on the shoulders of the sympathetic litigants in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 187 but the same phenomenon also exists in other areas of First Amendment expansion. The early commercial speech cases did not involve tobacco and liquor advertisers seeking to employ the best of Madison Avenue techniques in order to increase the market for their products, 188 but generally concerned upstarts frozen out by entrenched professional oligopolies like the "independent" pharmacists in Virginia Pharmacy' 89 and the established lawyers and law firms in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. 190 The litigants in the breakthrough fighting words cases were people whose primary crime was backtalk to bullying police officers, 19 ' and even the significant breakthroughs in obscenity law came largely as a consequence of the prosecution in the I96os of works of plausibly serious literature such as Lady Chatterley's Lover' 92 and Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure. 193 Although it is true that people you might not invite to lunch have been the major forces in crystallizing and reinforcing First Amendment doctrine, the doctrinal rules seem often to have arisen initially in the context of relatively more sympathetic litigants.1 9 4 By contrast, when arguments for expanding the boundaries of the First Amendment have been surrounded by unsympathetic litigants or classes of litigants -offerors of securities, telemarketers, price fixers, workplace gropers, con artists, terrorists, racist murderers, and indeed even music pirates, for example -the results have been different, 195 and the borders of the First Amendment have not shifted. The existence of a link with currently covered First Amendment items or domains may also make a difference. Tort liability for written or printed materials has set off First Amendment alarms when the materials have resembled the traditional mass media, but less so otherwise. 196 Although hostile-environment sexual harassment prohibitions have yet to be overturned in the name of the First Amendment, the shift from categorical rejection to serious consideration of First Amendment arguments occurred in the context of sexual harassment scenarios arising in familiar First Amendment domains -colleges and universities, most notably' 97 -or with familiar First Amendment items. Posting a Playboy centerfold on a woman worker's locker may not differ conceptually from making a crude sexual suggestion to her, but Playboy calls forth First Amendment images in a way that verbal suggestion does not.' 98 Even the pathway to commercial speech protection was paved, in part, by newspapers in cases like Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission.' 9 9 And though the First Amendment is rarely invoked when a criminal defendant's motives are inferred from his presence at a meeting at which others have spoken, inferring a motive from words in a book that the defendant simply owns raises plausible First Amendment claims that might otherwise seem silly.
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Possibly even more significant is the presence or absence of an existing and well-entrenched regulatory scheme. 20 ' Most of the domains in which significant content-based regulation of propositional speech has persisted -unimpeded by the First Amendment -have been domains in which an elaborate regulatory scheme, often managed by an agency dedicated to that form of regulation, is already in place.
2
Thus, the well-developed roles of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Trade Commission, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, the Office of the Register of Copyrights, the law of evidence, regimes of professional regulation, and quite a few other established mechanisms are likely important not only in regulating speech, but also in raising the stakes for its protection (and thus its nonregulation). It is one thing to make it harder to regulate a certain type of utterance, but another thing entirely to dismantle a longstanding regulatory structure. Because a decision to extend coverage is rarely compelled by existing doctrine or accepted theories, such a decision will always be in some sense discretionary, and that discretion is less likely to be exercised when the stakes (and thus the costs) of doing so are great.
Moreover, the existence of an established regulatory scheme may also produce an environment in which the likely challengers to that scheme have become comfortable with it and have learned how to use it to their advantage.
2 0 3 When as a result of the Lowe 20 4 case thousands of publishers were freed from the legal obligation to register with the SEC, only twenty took advantage of the privilege. This fact alone speaks volumes about the extent to which the nominal victims of pervasive content regulation, especially in highly regulated business environments, desire significant change. In many regulatory environments, the more respectable regulated parties -for example, those who offer FDA-approved diet supplements rather than those who sell diet earrings or soap that washes off fat 20 6 -have a stronger interest in regulation that differentiates them from some of their less reputable competitors than they have in being freed from regulation entirely. And if changes to the existing terrain of coverage and noncoverage require not just one litigant, but something approaching a genuine movement, 2 0 7 the failure to understand the dynamics of when those groups exist and of when they are mobilized to seek change will result in a deficient understanding of the dynamic forces that determine the shape of the First Amendment.
Finally, we can return to the First Amendment's magnetism and its ability to place some First Amendment issues at the center of public and media attention. As many of the examples here suggest, coverage may often be a function simply of the persistent visibility of First Amendment rhetoric, and noncoverage may conversely be a function of the failure of such rhetoric to take hold. In important respects, public and media attention to First Amendment claims may produce a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy in which First Amendment rhetoric newly applied to topics previously outside the First Amendment creates the visibility that itself helps to bring the entire topic into the domain of the First Amendment. Public and press attention may not have much influence over how courts decide First Amendment cases, but some of the examples discussed in this Article -copyright may be the strongest -suggest that such attention may have considerably more influence over which topics are deemed covered and which are not.
Although all of the factors described above seem tentatively important in determining both the willingness to challenge noncoverage decisions and the receptiveness of courts to those challenges, there are likely to be other factors as well. Still, if we look more systematically than I can here at the universe of examples of coverage and noncoverage, we may discover that the magnetism of the First Amendment plays a large role in determining which noncoverage decisions are challenged. Moreover, the existence of attractive litigants and a hook to traditional First Amendment items or topics, coupled with the nonexistence of an established regulatory scheme, may turn out to explain -as much as, if not more than, conventional doctrinal factorswhich of those challenges succeed and which do not. Success, however, cannot be measured, at least in the short term, solely in terms of litigation results; ultimately, the most significant factor in determining the shape of the First Amendment may be the ability of advocates to place their First Amendment-sounding claims on the public agenda. When those advocates succeed in doing so, the boundaries of the First Amendment, even as a matter of formal legal doctrine, seem more likely eventually to expand. But when First Amendment issues of novel coverage lack the attributes necessary to put those issues on the larger agenda, the pressures on the boundaries of the First Amendment often appear to be much weaker.
VIII. CONCLUSION: IN SEARCH OF CONSTITUTIONAL SALIENCE
Superficial appearances to the contrary, this Article's scope is not limited to the First Amendment. It is also about constitutional salience, the mysterious phenomenon by which issues become constitu-tionalized. 20 The phenomenon applies importantly to the First Amendment but pertains to other dimensions of American constitutional law as well. How some but not other equality issues get on the agenda of equal protection scrutiny, for example, is likely a process analogous to that involving freedom of speech and the press, although the precise factors involved are almost certainly different.
What makes the topic of constitutional salience important is precisely the way in which the incentives and dynamics of constitutional litigation are often substantially different from the incentives and dynamics of purely private litigation. Led by George Priest and Benjamin Klein, scholars have made important progress in identifying the economic and incentive factors that determine which private disputes will be contested in court, which court contests will proceed to verdict, and which verdicts will generate appellate opinions. 209 Undergirding this standard model of the selection of disputes for litigation is the notion that parties will not wage a court contest unless they each have a justified belief in the possibility that they might prevail.
When we depart private litigation for public law, however, these factors are likely to be quite different, particularly in the realm of constitutional law. When litigation is less a cost and more a consumption item, as it may be for many incarcerated prisoners (and as it was even more so prior to the enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995210), the shape of criminal procedure litigation can no longer be assessed by the standard economic selection model. When visible losses may generate more sympathy than less visible victories, as was the case with the Indianapolis antipornography ordinance, 2 1 ' it seems misguided to use likelihood of success as a factor to predict inclination to litigate. And when the conflict reflected in litigation is itself a good way of attracting a press that finds conflict newsworthy and slow progress tedious, bringing a lawsuit may be a valuable public relations strategy independent of the likelihood of success on the merits. Moreover, the complex institutional, bureaucratic, and ideological incentives of ideologically driven claimants and organizations make understand-208 On political salience, see KEN KOLLMAN, OUTSIDE LOBBYING: PUBLIC OPINION AND ing the initiation and pressing of constitutional litigation a complex affair scarcely explained by the economic selection model. Political scientists, historians, and legal academics have contributed significantly to our understanding of the role of social movements in the initiation of litigation 12 and, conversely, to our knowledge of the role of litigation in fueling social movements. Undoubtedly, some of that learning can be applied to understand the growth of the First Amendment's boundaries. But the special magnetic effect of the First Amendment not only makes the First Amendment an example of what we know about social movements and constitutional litigation, but also underscores the unique dynamics of the First Amendment itself. President Clinton did not suggest that the Democratic position on the Census be couched in due process or even in equal protection terms; the opponents of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" did not rely as much on the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim as they did on the First Amendment free speech claim; and economic libertarians now, unlike in the 1930s, gravitate to the First Amendment rather than to the Due Process or Contracts Clauses.
13
In all of these instances, the First Amendment has emerged, formal doctrine notwithstanding, as the argument of choice both inside and outside the legal arena; and those who have chosen this strategy can hardly be said to be misguided. They have identified and seized upon the First Amendment's rhetorical place in American political and legal argument, and have sought, hardly irrationally, to use this phenomenon in support of their causes. When we can fully explain both the causes and the consequences of this phenomenon, and thus when we fully appreciate the political psychology as well as the doctrine of the First Amendment, we will have made a large step toward understanding the unique role that the First Amendment has come to play in American constitutional politics and toward comprehending the way in which that role, as much as the doctrine, has determined the contours of the First Amendment itself. (2002) .
